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CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH, CONSTITUTIONAL  
REDEMPTION, AND POLITICAL SCIENCE:  
CAN FAITH AND POLITICAL SCIENCE COEXIST? 
H.W. PERRY, JR.∗
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Jack Balkin’s Constitutional Redemption is a terrific book.1
One reason the book is such a great teaching tool and so persua-
sive on many accounts is its conceit.  Balkin uses metaphors about re-
ligion and the device of storytelling to help explain much about our 
Constitution and our constitutional order.  Meanwhile, he makes his 
own arguments.  For the faithful, or those who have grown up around 
religion, the metaphors and analogies are clever and helpful.
  I admire 
it for many different reasons.  Like many great books, movies, or Bugs 
Bunny cartoons, it can be enjoyed on many different levels by many 
different audiences.  I know, because I teach about the Constitution 
in many different contexts.  As a law professor, I teach constitutional 
law to law students.  As a government professor, I teach constitutional 
interpretation, civil liberties, and the American political system to un-
dergraduates. I teach graduate research courses in public law to Ph.D. 
students.  I also work with high school and middle school teachers on 
teaching the Constitution and the Bill of Rights.  Constitutional Re-
demption is a valuable book for all of these audiences.  It conveys pro-
found and provocative ideas in very accessible ways that are, at once, 
intriguing to professors of constitutional law as well as to students and 
citizens.   
2
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 1. JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN UNJUST 
WORLD (2011). 
 2. Balkin, of course, is not the first to go down this path.  There have been analogies 
to religion and our Constitution and constitutional order from the very beginning.  It is 
Balkin’s long-time collaborator and friend, Sandy Levinson, who ranks the very first foot-
note in Constitutional Redemption.  Balkin writes, “I draw on Sanford Levinson’s famous 
comparison between American constitutional law and communities of faith in Sanford V. 
Levinson, Constitutional Faith (Princeton University Press 1989).”  Balkin’s work is so in-
formed by Levinson’s work that as I address the use of religious analogies in this Article, I 
am often referring to Levinson as much as Balkin.  In fact, what inspires this Article is a 
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ly instructive is his teaching about the importance of storytelling.  
Since the beginning of time, stories have been a way to grasp truths, 
convey understandings, and serve as framing mechanisms.3
I buy the redemption and faith metaphors, and I agree with him 
that much of our understanding of our past, present, and future de-
pends upon the stories we tell. I also agree with much of his story.  As 
with any metaphor or analogy, however, his are not perfect and there 
is one portion of his story that I find particularly problematic.  I have 
already described some of the different hats I wear: legal scholar, po-
litical scientist, teacher.  One thing I am not is a theologian, nor am I 
a particularly well-educated student of religion, including my own.  
Balkin’s knowledge of religion is so impressive that one wonders if he 
spent time in a seminary.  I am certain that he knows more about reli-
gion than I.  Modesty, however, never stops an academic.  I will sug-
gest some problems with his analogies to religion that might lead to 
some misunderstandings.  It is when I shed my borrowed theological 
robes and put on my political science hat (speaking of problematic 
metaphors) that I see more serious problems.  Balkin’s stories about 
political behavior and political mechanisms offered to justify a hope 
in redemption give me pause.   
 
II.  BALKIN’S GENERAL ARGUMENTS 
It is necessary to begin with a bare outline of Balkin’s arguments 
in order to make my own.4  Balkin begins his book by saying that it “is 
a book about faith, narrative, and constitutional change.”5  He is “in-
terested in how Americans continue their constitutional project with 
an ancient Constitution that is only sometimes just, often very unjust, 
and always in the process of changing.”6
 
conference in which Balkin’s book and the reissuance of Levinson’s book were jointly cel-
ebrated.   
  Of particular concern is 
Another example of using a religious analogy to help understand constitutional in-
terpretation is Sanford Levinson, On Interpretation: The Adultery Clause of the Ten Command-
ments, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 719, 719–25 (1985).  Levinson’s article provides a wonderful pe-
dagogical device that I use every year in my constitutional law classes.  I use it with equal 
profit with undergraduates and even for some public lectures.  
 3. Balkin does not claim credit for the idea of the importance of stories.  He says in a 
footnote that “[t]he most famous statement of this idea appears in Robert M. Cover, The 
Supreme Court 1982 Term—Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983).”  
BALKIN, supra note 1, at 253 n.2.  Nevertheless, Balkin develops the idea in impressive ways 
that are particularly instructive and accessible.   
 4. Balkin’s arguments are much more nuanced and subtle than I can convey here.  
Moreover, I am only addressing a small portion of his argument.   
 5. BALKIN, supra note 1, at 1. 
 6. Id. 
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“how do we square our attitude with a Constitution-in-practice that 
may be very unjust in practice?”7
The legitimacy of our Constitution depends, I believe, on 
our faith in the constitutional project and its future trajecto-
ry.  For if we lack faith in the Constitution, there is no point 
in being faithful to it.  Fidelity to the Constitution requires 
faith in the Constitution.  And our faith in the Constitution, 
in turn, depends on the story that we tell ourselves about our 
country, about our constitutional project, and about our 
place within them.
  He answers: 
8
He goes on to argue that: 
 
To believe in the constitutional project is to believe in a sto-
ry.  At the heart of constitutions are stories: stories about 
foundings, to be sure, but also stories about people: the 
people who create the constitution and people who contin-
ue it, the people who fight for it and the people who fight 
over it, the people who live under it and the people to whom 
it belongs.  These are constitutional stories because they are 
stories about the constitution as a project of human politics 
and human action.9
Balkin suggests different stories that might justify constitutional 
faith.  A prominent example is the “Great Progressive Narrative,” 
which argues that despite some mistakes America is “getting better 
and better, more just and more free.”
 
10  He rejects this story especially 
to the extent that it conveys inevitability.  He also rejects a narrative of 
decline that suggests things have gotten worse and calls for a return to 
the wisdom of the Framers.11  However, not all stories justify faith in 
the Constitution.  One such story he confronts several times in the 
book is William Lloyd Garrison’s famous claim that the Constitution 
was “born in sin” because it accommodated slavery.  As such it was a 
“covenant with death, and an agreement with hell.”  Garrison’s idea is 
taken from a quotation from the prophet Isaiah who suggests “that 
political compromises with evil are doomed to failure.”12
 
 7. Id. at 2. 
  Balkin be-
lieves that “Garrison is a useful corrective to the Great Progressive 
Narrative . . . [but] only half right.  The Constitution begins, as Garri-
 8. Id. (footnote omitted). 
 9. Id. (footnote omitted).   
 10. Id. at 3. 
 11. Id. at 5. 
 12. Id. 
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son said, as an agreement with hell.  But that is the beginning of its 
story, not its end.”13
The question is whether the Constitution can improve over 
time, whether it contains the resources for its own redemp-
tion, and whether the people who live under it and pledge 
fidelity to it can form a more perfect Union . . . . The 
Preamble to the Constitution sets a purpose that has never 
been fully achieved but is our duty to achieve.
  Balkin argues:  
14
With this corrective to Garrison, Balkin begins to give his own 
story.  “We need a narrative of redemption because all constitutions 
are agreements with hell, flawed, . . . [and] exist in a fallen condi-
tion.”
   
15  For anyone who has been to a tent revival, the words sound 
very familiar.  One expects him to go on to say, “But brothers and sis-
ters, despite our fallen condition, I am here to tell you tonight that 
the Constitution can be redeemed, but to believe in redemption re-
quires faith.”  Then we would hear the request for affirmation, “and 
the people shall say, Amen.”  What he actually writes is, “To answer 
that the Constitution can be redeemed is to have faith in a transgene-
rational project of politics.  This faith is essential to the Constitution’s 
legitimacy.  It can be argued for, but it cannot be proven. It is a leap 
of faith.”16  He also references the Talmud, not so often heard at re-
vivals, which “tells us: you are not required to complete the Great 
Work; but neither are you free to refrain from it.”17
Why use such religious imagery when the project is clearly 
secular?  The reason is that constitutional traditions have 
much in common with religious traditions, and especially re-
   Balkin’s story is 
one of faith, good works, redemption, and yes, proselytizing.  Antic-
ipating critics for his use of religious imagery, Balkin writes: 
 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 15. Id. at 6. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id.  I might have preferred the passage from the Passover ritual found in the Hag-
gadah: 
The struggle for freedom is a continuous struggle, for never does mankind reach 
total liberty and opportunity. In every age, some new freedom is won and estab-
lished, adding to the advancement of human happiness and security.  Yet each 
age uncovers a formerly unrecognized servitude, requiring new liberation to set 
the human soul free.  In every age the concept of freedom grows broader, widen-
ing horizons for finer and nobler living.  Each generation is duty-bound to con-
tribute to this growth, else our ideals become stagnant and stationary.  
See Haggadah for Passover (David Schwartz ed., 2011), available at http:// 
www.whitebearunitarian.org/wbuuc/images/haggadah%202011%20one-up.pdf  
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ligious traditions that feature a central organizing text that 
states the tradition’s core beliefs.  We must have a way to talk 
about the commitments of a people in a creedal tradition 
spanning many years, involving the work of many genera-
tions . . . and organized around the maintenance and inter-
pretation of an ancient creedal text.  Many religions have 
faced the same problems of community and continuity and 
so have developed languages and concepts to deal with pre-
cisely these questions.  Faith, hope, commitment, and re-
demption are universal human concerns.  That is why the 
language of religion is particularly useful in understanding 
the path of the American Constitution . . . .18
I fundamentally agree with the analogy thus far and accept its useful-
ness generally. But, of course, the devil is in the details.   
 
III.  UPON THIS ROCK: LEVINSON’S CONSTITUTIONAL PROTESTANTISM 
AND CATHOLICISM 
It is at this point that I must turn to Sandy Levinson’s Constitu-
tional Faith because Balkin has built his argument upon Levinson’s re-
ligious analogies.  Levinson famously argued in Constitutional Faith 
that we can think about interpreting the Constitution in terms of 
Protestantism versus Catholicism.  He gives a wonderfully concise and 
understandable discussion of these two strains of Christianity, which 
also includes some interesting analogs to other faiths.  Levinson 
writes: “It is well known that the Protestant reformers, especially the 
followers of Martin Luther, emphasized the centrality of Scripture to 
Christianity.  Sola scriptura were the great watchwords; an authentic 
Christianity must be based on the Scriptures alone.”19  This is juxta-
posed to Catholic theology that “supplemented reliance on Scripture 
with the independent authority of oral tradition as mediated through 
the magisterium—the teaching authority—of the Church.”20
As declared at the Council of Trent—the 1546 counterattack 
against Protestant heresies—unwritten traditions were coe-
qual in stature to Scripture, and these traditions were stated 
to be those “which were received by the apostles from the 
lips of Christ himself, or by the same apostles at the dictation 
of the Holy Spirit and were handed down and have come 
  Levinson 
writes: 
 
 18. BALKIN, supra note 1, at 7. 
 19. SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 18 (rev. ed. 2011) (1988). 
 20. Id. 
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down to us.”  The key to the authoritativeness of tradition 
was its preservation “by unbroken succession in the 
Church.”21
To help further explain the theological divide, Levinson refers to 
an argument made by Cardinal Bellarmine in his treatise The Word of 
God: 
 
Lutherans were mistaken in asserting that “everything neces-
sary for faith and behavior is contained in the scriptures,” 
for “as well as the written word of God we require the un-
written word, that is the divine and apostolic traditions.”  
Because Scripture is often “ambiguous and perplexing,” said 
Bellarmine, there are “many places in which we shall be un-
able to reach certainty” unless the text is supplemented “by 
accepting the traditions of the Church.”22
Levinson proceeds to analogize the Protestant/Catholic theolog-
ical divide to contending theories of constitutional interpretation.  
There are two components to the analogy.  First, there is the question 
of what the Constitution is and how to interpret it.  One can have a 
protestant or catholic approach to that.  Second, there is the question 
of who has the ultimate authority to declare the meaning of the Con-
stitution?  One can be protestant or catholic on that question as well.  
Importantly, one need not be uniformly catholic or protestant in ans-
wering the two questions.  Though Levinson has a more subtle discus-
sion, essentially, a protestant’s answer to the first question involves 
simply looking at the text of the Constitution to resolve constitutional 
questions.  Levinson quotes, of all people, Frederick Douglass as an 
example:  
 
[One must] ascertain what the Constitution itself is. . . . The 
American Constitution is a written instrument full and com-
plete in itself.  No Court in America, no Congress, no Presi-
dent can add a single word thereto, or take a single word 
there from . . . that the mere text, and only the text, and not 
any commentaries or creeds written by those who wished to 
give the text a meaning apart from its plain reading was 
 
 21. Id. (quoting 3 CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF THE BIBLE: THE WEST FROM THE 
REFORMATION TO THE PRESENT DAY 193–94 (S.L. Greenslade ed., 1963)). 
 22. Id. at 19 (quoting QUENTIN SKINNER, 2 THE FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN POLITICAL 
THOUGHT: THE AGE OF REFORMATION 146 (1978)).  Levinson points out that this differ-
ence of relying solely on text as compared to other sources of authority is found in many 
religions including Islam and Judaism.  Id. at 19–21. 
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adopted as the Constitution of the United States.23
Think Hugo Black as the best modern expositor of this idea.   
   
A catholic interpretation suggests that the written Constitution is 
supplemented by an unwritten constitution.24  Adherents are exempli-
fied by Justice Felix Frankfurter (the Constitution “is most significant-
ly not a document but a stream of history”) and Justice John Marshall 
Harlan, who is “perhaps the greatest exemplar of ‘catholicism,’” ac-
cording to Levinson.25  Thinking of Justice Harlan’s opinion in Poe v. 
Ullman,26 Levinson notes that Justice Harlan rejected the idea that the 
words of the Constitution alone were sufficient to understand the 
meaning of due process and saw tradition as necessary to give it mean-
ing.27
The second issue involves who has the ultimate authority to de-
cide what the Constitution means.  Here the protestant/catholic 
analogy is even clearer.  A catholic perspective suggests that, like the 
Pope for Catholics, the United States Supreme Court is the final, in-
fallible authority on the meaning of the Constitution.  Non-Catholics 
often misunderstand the doctrine of papal infallibility, thinking that it 
is a claim that a pope cannot err.  That is not the claim.  Infallibility 
means that, when invoked, the Pope’s word is final.  The constitution-
al analog is epitomized in Justice Jackson’s famous statement that, 
“We are not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only 
because we are final.”
   
28  At least since the time of Cooper v. Aaron,29
[Marbury v. Madison] declared the basic principle that the 
federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of 
the Constitution and that principle has ever since been res-
pected by this Court and the Country as a permanent and 
 
there has been little doubt about how catholic and how papal the view 
of the Supreme Court is, particularly in the eyes of the Justices them-
selves.  In Cooper, Chief Justice Warren wrote:  
 
 23. Id. at 31 (quoting Frederick Douglass, The Constitution of the United States: Is It Pro-
Slavery or Anti-Slavery, in 2 THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS 467, 467–80 
(Philip Sheldon Foner ed., 1950)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 24. There are volumes written on the idea of an “unwritten Constitution.”  For a classic 
recounting of the issue, see Thomas C. Grey, The Constitution as Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1 
(1984).   
 25. LEVINSON, supra note 19, at 34. 
 26. 367 U.S. 497 (1961). 
 27. LEVINSON, supra note 19, at 34. 
 28. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 29. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958). 
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indispensable feature of our constitutional system.30
Scholars debate who handed the keys to the Justices—the Consti-
tution properly understood, John Marshall, the Warren Court—but 
secular papists the Justices have become.  A catholic understanding of 
the Court’s authority is not limited to the Justices.  There is little to-
lerance in the United States generally for a protestant “priesthood of 
all believers” approach.
 
31  The Supreme Court’s interpretation is au-
thoritative and binding.  Levinson points out that when Ronald Rea-
gan’s Attorney General Edwin Meese suggested that there was a dis-
tinction between the Constitution and constitutional law as 
promulgated by the Court and that perhaps the Supreme Court’s in-
terpretation was only binding upon the parties to the case, the blow-
back was swift and fierce.  Of course, Meese’s interpretation was not 
new.  Andrew Jackson, Abraham Lincoln, and Franklin Roosevelt, to 
name a few prominent examples, made essentially the same argu-
ment.  But in recent history, and particularly at the time Levinson 
wrote his book, Meese’s interpretation was seen as heretical and as 
justification for intellectual excommunication.  Nevertheless, Levin-
son notes that there still are some who support a protestant perspec-
tive on interpretational authority.  Most notable are Ronald Dworkin 
and Levinson himself.32
Balkin basically adopts Levinson’s characterizations of constitu-
tional protestantism and catholicism, although he will qualify them.  
The fact that America is constitutionally protestant is fundamentally 
  (Who is excommunicated in religion and the 
academy has always seemed a bit arbitrary.)  Still, few in America to-
day would find acceptable the proposition that after the Supreme 
Court declares that the Constitution means X, that the people, or 
Congress, or Presidents should feel free to disregard the authority of 
the Court to have the final say on constitutionality.  That of course 
does not mean that people have to agree with the Court, but it does 
mean that they have acceded to the idea that it is the final authority 
and expositor of constitutionality.   
 
 30. Id. at 18. 
 31. As with most theological positions there is not universal agreement about what the 
term “priesthood of all believers” or “priesthood of the believer” means even within de-
nominations.  As commonly used, however, it suggests that every individual believer is in a 
relationship with God that is unmediated by others and that individuals can read (and in-
terpret) Scripture for themselves.   
 32. Since the time of Levinson’s initial writing, there are rumblings of a Protestant re-
formation with regard to the Supreme Court, see, e.g., MARK V. TUSHNET, TAKING THE 
CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999).  I think it is fair to say that the Reforma-
tion has not yet arrived, and it is unlikely that it will for reasons that are detailed below. 
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what allows Balkin to believe in the possibility of constitutional re-
demption.  As he writes: 
[C]onstitutional legitimacy depends in part on protestant 
constitutionalism—the ability of ordinary citizens to claim 
the Constitution as their Constitution, to assert in public 
what they believe it truly means, to organize in civil society 
and in politics and persuade others of their views.  Constitu-
tional change occurs because Americans attempt to per-
suade each other about the best meaning of constitutional 
text and principle in their own time.  By making protestant 
constitutional arguments, individuals and groups can turn 
claims that were once marginal or off-the-wall into accepted 
views, or at the very least influence future constitutional de-
velopment.33
Not just any old Protestantism works.  Balkin is certainly not a 
Calvinist.  Individuals are in charge of their own and the republic’s 
destiny.  Balkin does not believe that there is an inevitability of re-
demption.  Free will and constitutional protestantism need not neces-
sarily lead to a just constitutional order in the end, but it provides 
Balkin with enough faith to stay in the fold.   
  
There is one more important tenet to Balkin’s faith.  He claims 
to have had a conversion experience.  He has become an originalist.  
It is a decision made by an adult who has been born again and appar-
ently has undergone a believer’s baptism.  This is a conversion that 
evidently requires a personal testimony and a profession of faith.34  
His new faith is in a particular type of originalism that he calls 
“framework originalism.”  To the outsider, the qualifier “framework” 
makes it seem unlikely that he needs to reject many of his prior be-
liefs, which raises questions about the true nature of the conversion.  
But that is for him to declare.  He apparently believes that it is 
enough of a conversion to require being rebaptized.35
 
 33. BALKIN, supra note 
  This is not to 
say that his position is incorrect, but it is not generally what is meant 
by originalism.  In any event, Balkin as an originalist is not the topic 
1, at 235. 
 34. See id. at 226–50 (Chapter 8, “How I Became and Originalist”); see also JACK M. 
BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011) (Balkin’s most recent book that followed shortly after 
Constitutional Redemption).  
 35. When Balkin responds to the question of whether one believes in constitutional 
protestantism, he refers to an old joke about believing in baptism.  Maybe the joke also 
applies to whether one can believe in framework originalism.  After Balkin’s conversion, 
one can say, “I not only believe in it, I’ve seen it done.”  BALKIN, supra note 1, at 99.  It 
sounds like Balkin has chosen sprinkling as opposed to immersion; but Balkin, like all 
non-immersionists, presumably would say a baptism is a baptism.   
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here.  His understanding of the Constitution as a framework is rele-
vant, however, because it requires constitutional protestantism, and 
for true reform that justifies redemption, evangelical fervor.  
IV.  THE DETAILS OF THE STORY BUT MISSING FROM THE PLOT: 
RESPONSIVENESS, AUTHORITY, AND POLITICAL SCIENCE 
Now to the particular story that Balkin chooses to tell and my 
qualms about the plot.  Balkin tells us that all faith stories are both as-
pirational and descriptive.  Fair enough, but his story seems so much 
more aspirational than descriptive that it troubles me, especially when 
wearing my political scientist vestments (or is it my hat?).  Even as a 
social scientist, I believe that stories and anecdotal observations are 
important and that change can occur against all odds.  But I also ac-
cept the need for more data before being comfortable with drawing 
systemic conclusions or making predictions.  Balkin’s story often does 
not mirror reality, or more precisely, examples seem to be more 
anecdotal than evidence of systematic and systemic behavior.  This is 
of even more concern when looking to the future and trying to pre-
dict it, which, after all, is when redemption shall occur justifying con-
tinued faith.   
Balkin understands how the American political system works as 
well as any political scientist.  His story does not spring from naiveté.  
He does have some evidence and could find more to counter some of 
my claims.  It is just that he and I are reading the evidence and the tea 
leaves differently.  Or for another metaphor, maybe he sees a glass 
half full and I, five-eighths empty and leaking.  His story does not suf-
ficiently account for systemic and behavioral features that exist and 
are growing that thwart protestant constitutionalism in the American 
political system.  I suspect that he would say that even if I were right in 
my descriptions, the anecdotes or exceptions are enough to justify 
faith.  But it is the faith of a mustard seed.  His descriptions that 
strengthen his faith are too rosy.  I hope I am wrong, and I should 
confess that I am not convinced that he is wrong in terms of the pos-
sibility that his aspirational story will come true.  I am not saying I 
have lost faith, but were my faith wholly dependent upon Balkin’s sto-
ry, I would be having a crisis of faith.36
Balkin argues that because of our protestant constitutionalism 
and our written text Constitution, individual citizens can read the 
   
 
 36. I am not here to confess my own constitutional faith or offer my own theology; that 
would be too difficult.  I take the easy road of critic to evaluate Balkin’s faith and redemp-
tion story on its own terms.   
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Constitution for themselves (as individuals are free to read the scrip-
tures) and in doing so, they make the Constitution their own and feel 
free to assert their own understanding of the Constitution.  Because 
of this, they feel free to disagree with that most catholic and papal of 
institutions, the Supreme Court, and assert another constitutional vi-
sion.  He writes: 
The constitutional culture of the United States is democratic 
and participatory . . . .  [The Constitution] belongs to them, 
and it is not the exclusive province of a set of professional 
elites.  Although the public relies on lawyers and judges to 
expound and enforce the law in everyday situations . . . [the 
public has] the right to pronounce on the meaning of the 
Constitution whenever it feels that its values have not been 
respected.37
Balkin parts company with Levinson about the protes-
tant/catholic divide in an important way.  He suggests that Levinson 
treats them as ideal types “representing an opposition between indi-
vidual conscience and institutional authority.”  Balkin suggests “in 
practice each incorporates elements of the other and depends on the 
other.  This interrelation is hidden when we think about the Constitu-
tion statically.  It becomes apparent when we view the Constitution-in-
practice as a dynamic system.”
 
38
Despite the Supreme Court’s pronouncement, we live, as we 
always have, in a world of constitutional dissensus—a world 
in which many people believe that the Supreme Court has 
gotten it wrong and that their own view is the right one.  
These people gather and form social movements; they influ-
ence political parties or take them over.  Eventually some of 
them change the norms of society, and they or their allies 
succeed in appointing judges and justices who interpret the 
Constitution in new and different ways.
  He argues: 
39
No one can deny in theory that the system can work this way, and 
there is evidence to prove that it has.  Balkin recites familiar changes 
over history such as the ending of slavery and the 1937 New Deal revo-




 37. BALKIN, supra note 
  Of 
1, at 236 (footnotes omitted). 
 38. Id. at 96. 
 39. Id. 
 40. He describes these changes, however, in terms that are different from the explana-
tions of other constitutional theorists such as Bruce Ackerman.  This is one example of 
why his book is interesting for constitutional theorists and is not simply for the lay person.   
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course, ending slavery required a civil war, and we still have not elim-
inated its lingering effects.  Nevertheless, one cannot deny his basic 
point that things such as social movements can effect constitutional 
change.  Balkin points out that this is not solely a historical pheno-
menon.  He directs us to the gay rights movement and its progress or 
the conservative takeover of the judiciary in recent decades.  But all 
political systems—even the most authoritarian—respond to public 
pressure and social movements over time in some ways.  Surely more 
than that is required for a profession of faith.   
The question is not so much the existence of constitutional dis-
sensus but what happens or can happen as a result.  Balkin anticipates 
this criticism particularly in the context of distinguishing himself from 
Levinson.  He suggests that the criticism takes the form of arguing 
that the real question is the question of authority.  Such criticism 
should be expected, of course, from political scientists like Levinson 
and me.  Politics, constitutional or otherwise, is largely about power 
and authority.41  Balkin tries to answer this by suggesting that we must 
understand the concept of authority and how it changes.  The critics, 
he says, are asking the wrong question: “By reducing the debate be-
tween constitutional catholicism and protestantism to a simple nor-
mative question about who has authority at a particular moment, one 
makes it impossible to discuss the mechanisms for constitutional 
change that produce authority.”42  But Balkin’s response seems equal-
ly reductive.  All political systems are responsive and have mechanisms 
for change that produce authority.  The relevant question is how res-
ponsive is the system to the protestant-inspired constitutional dissen-
sus, or is it sufficiently responsive.  An important aspect of responsive-
ness is the time it takes to change.  This has to be part of the 
equation.  The fact that things eventually may change is surely not 
enough.43
Who has the authority, the extent of the authority, and how easily 
it can be changed does matter; it matters a lot.  Political scientists, 
starting with Aristotle, classify political systems based on their respon-
siveness, and the nature of the responsiveness is the source of norma-
tive and empirical arguments about those systems.  Moreover, shrewd 
  As the old quip goes, eventually, we all will die. 
 
 41. Probably the most famous modern definition of politics is David Easton’s: “Politics 
is the authoritative allocation of values.”  A FRAMEWORK FOR POLITICAL ANALYSIS 50 (1965). 
 42. BALKIN, supra note 1, at 100. 
 43. I am reminded of Thurgood Marshall’s response to a reporter when asked about 
the suggestion of some people that there are problems if you try to go too far too fast on a 
topic like civil rights.  “I’m the world’s original gradualist.  I just think ninety-odd years is 
gradual enough!”  THE I. F. STONE’S WEEKLY READER (May 19, 1958). 
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political leaders, religious or otherwise, do not remain passive in the 
face of dissensus.  I suspect that the current pope and his predecessor 
have put in mechanisms that will thwart changes that might be con-
templated because of rather robust dissensus of the past decades.  
This is just a guess as I am not a student of Vatican politics.44
My basic argument is that the mechanisms for constitutional 
change that Balkin touts are a cause for less optimism than he im-
plies.  Even if one is persuaded that they have worked historically, 
there are many more obstacles today.  The questions are whether the 
current obstacles undermine Balkin’s story, and are the obstacles rela-
tively permanent—a one-way ratchet such that popular movements 
will find resistance to them increasingly difficult to overcome.   
  As a 
student of politics, I am certain that political leaders erect barriers to 
protect against responsiveness.  Cynical, smart, authoritarian political 
regimes often allow and encourage political dissensus, but sophisti-
cated observers do not believe that it suggests any hope for real politi-
cal change.  Sometimes it gets out of control and some change hap-
pens, but more often than not, it takes a real revolution to bring 
about the change.  Within democratic polities, the story is not wholly 
different.  Like authoritarian rulers, democratic leaders have also read 
Machiavelli.  The way to thwart change is to try to hinder those me-
chanisms that might facilitate change.   
V.  THE CATHOLIC SUPREME COURT AND THE FAITHFUL 
At the end of his book, when Balkin turns to his argument for 
framework originalism, he returns to the concept of a protestant con-
stitutional culture.  He continues his earlier argument for the ability 
of Americans to interpret the Constitution on their own and to feel 
free to disagree with Justices as to its meaning.  He says:  
In American constitutional culture ordinary individuals, as 
well as groups in civil society, expect that they have the right 
to say what the Constitution means.  They expect that the 
meaning of the Constitution (and thus of the country itself) 
is not merely a matter of elite opinion or professional know-
ledge but should be responsive to popular understanding 
 
 44. One well-known scholar was committed to being a political scientist and a devout 
Catholic.  Walter Murphy thoroughly understood the politics of the Catholic Church and 
loved to discuss it as only a political scientist could.  Those of us who had the privilege of 
hearing Walter expound on it over and beyond his writings were lucky to sit in great tuto-
rials.  He is sorely missed for many reasons, but his capacious understanding of politics is 
unsurpassed.  
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and values.  Indeed, people may resist the notion that judges 
or professional elites know better than they do what the 
Constitution means. . . . 
 For the Constitution to be “our Constitution,” members of 
the public must feel that they are able to participate in its in-
terpretation and constructions.  It is not enough that lawyers 
can talk among themselves. . . . 
 Because We the People have ordained and established the 
Constitution, it is ours.  Its fate is in the hand of the citizenry 
and not just the courts. . . . Democratic authorship is demo-
cratic authorization to say what the Constitution means.45
Does any of that sound even remotely close to the way our system 
currently works or is likely to work?  These quotes are arguably aspira-
tional for a world in which framework originalism exists, but Balkin 
seems to suggest that they describe American protestantism as it exists 
today.  If we were to accept framework orginalism as the right consti-
tutional philosophy, such protestantism, he suggests, would only ex-
pand.  I neither see much evidence of this now, nor do I see any evi-
dence that it is likely for the future.  In fact, I see just the opposite. 
 
Crucial to Balkin’s argument is the relationship between the Su-
preme Court and relevant publics.  No matter how protestant are his 
and our views of the Constitution, for reasons argued above, he must 
confront a catholic Court—a very catholic Court.46
 
 45. BALKIN, supra note 
  More importantly, 
he must confront a very catholic public when it comes to the authority 
of the Supreme Court.  Balkin is not so troubled by this because he 
claims that potential critics ignore interrelatedness and feedback me-
chanisms.  It is always a good social science move to point out the ex-
istence of some feedback mechanism or interrelatedness, but exis-
tence does not equal efficacy.  The Vatican has to deal with much 
dissensus and protestant behavior within the church—those pesky 
nuns, those Georgetown theologians, that American church.  Feed-
back mechanisms exist within the church.  But few would place much 
hope in the dissensus and feedback mechanisms causing a change in 
enunciated papal policy.  Nor would many see much hope that when 
they next saw a puff of white smoke that their dissensus and feedback 
1, at 237. 
 46. It goes without saying that labeling this as a Catholic Supreme Court has nothing 
to do with the religion of the Justices.  Certainly, Levinson, Balkin, and I are not claiming 
that their religious affiliation has anything to do with the claims about the authority of the 
Supreme Court.  There have, however, been some who argue that the religion of the Jus-
tices might be important in other contexts.  See e.g., William Blake, God Save This Honorable 
Court: Religion as a Source of Judicial Policy Preferences, POL. RES. Q. (forthcoming 2012). 
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would have mattered much.  To do so would be to turn Catholicism 
into Protestantism or simply to see it as differences of degree rather 
than kind.  No committed Protestant would be persuaded to convert 
because some feedback mechanisms exist.   
Balkin acknowledges a catholic Supreme Court.  So how does all 
this protestant dissensus work with a catholic Supreme Court?  Appar-
ently, discussion and dissensus will spur constitutional change largely 
by keeping ideas alive with the ultimate hope of trying to take over 
the Court in the future.  This is done by electing politicians who will 
appoint Justices with their vision.  This is truly a house that Jack built 
argument.  Evidence, however, suggests that we have come to believe 
in the interpretations of the secular holy fathers and mothers on the 
Court for constitutional wisdom, and their pronouncements increa-
singly end rather than generate debate.  This is so not only among the 
public, but also among elites and office holders as well.  Gordon Sil-
verstein has referred to this as how law kills politics.47
Of course there are counter examples that Balkin can use to 
support his story.  Roe v. Wade
   
48 did not stop the constitutional debate 
about abortion.  Bowers v. Hardwick49
A.  Controlling the Court Through Elections 
 did not stop the debate about 
gay rights.  But in some ways, Balkin is, as empirical researchers would 
say, “selecting on the dependent variable.”  Another way of saying it is 
that the exceptions prove the rule.  To a political scientist, the ques-
tion is not can the system be responsive, it is how responsive is it.  
What are the significant impediments to responsiveness?  The trend 
seems to be going opposite of what Balkin argues, and there are struc-
tural reasons to think the trend will continue.  This is not simply the 
argument that Levinson brought up about the reaction to Ed Meese.  
Criticism of Meese focused mostly on obeying judgments of a court.  
The trend I am suggesting is that increasingly the Supreme Court 
tends to hijack robust constitutional discussion.   
Let us examine Balkin’s hope about electing officials to effect 
change by their judicial appointments.  Despite heated rhetoric by po-
litical candidates about the next president making appointments to 
the Supreme Court, there is little evidence to support that this ranks 
very high as a determining factor when casting a vote.  Given what po-
 
 47. GORDON SILVERSTEIN, LAW’S ALLURE: HOW LAW SHAPES, CONSTRAINS, SAVES, AND 
KILLS POLITICS (2009). 
 48. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 49. 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
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litical science has taught us about voting behavior, we know that vot-
ing is rarely driven by single issues, particularly something as compli-
cated as the meaning of some aspect of the Constitution.  Abortion 
might be the best example in favor of such a single issue vote, but 
even that usually does not explain a vote, especially at the national 
level.  It is very hard to link voter beliefs about what the Constitution 
means to voting behavior, and even if it is done indirectly, it is unlike-
ly to represent a very robust translation of public understandings and 
visions of the Constitution.  Even so, Balkin’s argument still might 
have legs.  One might say, as most political scientists do, what drives 
votes is mostly partisan identification, and parties do represent consti-
tutional visions.  L.A. (Scot) Powe and I have argued as much and 
claim that over the past two generations, the Democratic and Repub-
lican parties have come to fundamentally different conceptions of the 
Constitution.50
The Court was always designed to be somewhat unresponsive, but 
mechanisms have changed to make it even more so.  First there is the 
problem surrounding the appointment of judges.  I am not as worried 
here about the current gridlock that has prevented the Senate from 
confirming people to fill vacancies.  That could change with large ma-
jorities.  There is every reason to suspect, however, that given the fili-
buster rule, we are in for effectively divided government and gridlock 
within the Senate for a long time.  Who gets to appoint the Justices 
still matters, and Democrats and Republicans will be somewhat differ-
ent from one another.  But the divided Senate tempers the type of 
appointments that can be made.  Confirmation requires walking a 
tightrope.  Nominees who can walk the tightrope and make it 
through the appointment process are not likely to be ones who will 
respond to calls for a new constitutional vision.  What concerns me 
most, however, is that it has become acceptable, indeed advisable, for 
judicial nominees to say virtually nothing about their constitutional 
  Given that party is a significant explainer of votes, 
both of voters and legislators, this offers potential support for the Bal-
kin argument.  However, we also argue that the constitutional visions 
of the parties have differed from the Constitution as interpreted by 
the Supreme Court.  The trend of the Court going its own way under-
cuts the electoral accountability tie.  Who is seated on this secular 
Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith (a.k.a. the Supreme 
Court) will matter of course, and it will have some ties to parties and 
the electorate, but it is not a very responsive body.   
 
 50. H.W. Perry, Jr. & L.A. Powe, Jr., The Political Battle for the Constitution, 21 CONST. 
COMMENT. 641, 641–96 (2004). 
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philosophy.  Hiding under the “there may someday be a case that will 
come before the Court, therefore, I cannot answer” dodge has be-
come the rule.  There is so much wrong about this from a democratic 
theory perspective that another article could be written about it.  As 
just one example, the confirmation is effectively the only moment of 
political accountability for an official who will be a lifetime appointee 
subject to virtually no subsequent democratic accountability or con-
straints.  Indeed, these days even Presidents claim not to know the 
appointee’s position on important constitutional questions.  This new 
norm for the judicial confirmation process seems unlikely to change, 
and it definitely poses problems for the linkage story Balkin tells. 
There is a related problem that appears to be another new norm 
that is unlikely to change.  It, too, raises questions about the story of 
how the people’s understanding of the Constitution will make it onto 
the Court via judicial appointments. These days the only people seen 
as being qualified for Supreme Court appointment appear to be 
judges, and federal judges at that.  (Well, apparently being U.S. Solici-
tor General counts, too.)  Powe and I have argued that this might 
help account for the fact that the Supreme Court has been instituting 
its own vision of the Constitution rather than the constitutional view 
of the parties.  Federal judges do not seem to be the most likely can-
didates to be responsive to constitutional protestantism.  Were we to 
return to an earlier era when governors, senators, and others closer to 
the people were legitimate nominees who made it to the Court with 
some frequency, there might be better support for Balkin.  But there 
is no evidence to suggest that will occur. In fact in recent nomi-
nations, not having been a federal judge was argued as a reason for 
disqualification. 
B.  Controlling the Court and Constitutional Change by Elites  
One might say that even if Balkin is a bit too optimistic about cit-
izen constitutional discussion and its ability to influence the Court 
through electoral mechanisms, the relevant Constitution-debating 
public involves other elites, notably elected officials.  But the trend is 
not very promising there either.  Governing officials have increasingly 
put aside serious discussions of constitutionality.  There have been 
different explanations for this.  Officials increasingly see their deci-
sions as only penultimate, especially if it involves an important consti-
tutional question.  Some members of Congress have even come to 
suggest that it might not be Congress’s responsibility to make consti-
tutional judgments.  It is hard to see how they could conclude that 
given the oath they take; but with the modern understanding of Su-
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preme Court supremacy, it has become easier to say that constitutio-
nality is the responsibility of a judge, not a member of Congress.  
Whatever they believe about their role, there are strong incentives for 
them not to wrestle with the issue of constitutionality and to pass the 
buck.51  Even when legislators take seriously their responsibility to de-
bate the constitutionality of legislation, once the Court has ruled, it 
seems to stop them dead in their tracks.  There have been virtually no 
serious attempts to “punish” the Court for many years by things such 
as impeachment, changing the size of the Court, jurisdiction strip-
ping, or even budget reduction.52
There can be little doubt that the Court has done little to foster 
the idea that anyone other than it should be the constitutional oracle.  
Scot Powe in his very important book on the Supreme Court has put 
it more bluntly.
   
53
Equally important as Planned Parenthood v. Casey’s refusal to 
overrule Roe v. Wade was what the opinion by Sandra Day 
O’Connor, Anthony Kennedy, and David Souter said about 
the role of the Court in American society.
  He refers to the Court as an “Imperial Court.”  Inte-
restingly, he has his most biting comments in this regard not for the 
typical suspects, but for Justices O’Connor, Souter, and Kennedy, 




The troika’s opinion in Casey is the most pretentious in the 
United States Reports.  It asserted that the belief Americans 
hold of themselves as a people who live according to the rule 
of law “was not readily separable from their understanding 
of the Court . . . [as] speak[ing] before all others for their 
constitutional ideals.” . . . “Before” meant way above. Thus 
“[i]f the Court’s legitimacy should be undermined, then, so 
would the country be in its very ability to see itself through 
its constitutional ideals.  The Court’s concern with legitima-
 
 51. See, e.g., Neal Devins, Congress as Culprit, 51 DUKE L.J. 435 (2001); Mark Graber, The 
Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the Judiciary, 7 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 35 
(1993). 
 52. James L. Gibson, Public Reverence for the U.S. Supreme Court: Is the Court Invincible 
(Feb. 27, 2012) (working paper version at 35) (paper was presented at the Countermajori-
tarian Conference hosted by The University of Texas Law School on March 29–30, 2012), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?Abstract_id=1898485.  
 53. LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE SUPREME COURT AND THE AMERICAN ELITE 1789–2008 
(2009). 
 54. Id. at 312. 
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cy is not for the sake of the Court, but for the sake of the Na-
tion.”55
In the few instances where Congress has pushed back substantive-
ly on a ruling, the Court has shut it down, and Congress accepts the 
smackdown without retribution.  Most notable was the brouhaha over 
the Free Exercise Clause started by the Court’s ruling in Employment 
Division v. Smith.
 
56  In Smith, the Court overturned its longstanding re-
quirement that strict scrutiny be the standard employed in certain 
free exercise claims.  Smith removed that requirement when a law did 
not target religion.  In response, Congress quickly passed the Reli-
gious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA),57 which said that the stan-
dard should go back to the pre-Smith requirement triggering strict 
scrutiny, thereby necessitating a compelling interest demonstration 
on the part of the government.  Congress passed the Act under its 
Section 5 authority under the Fourteenth Amendment.  Particularly 
remarkable was that the law passed the House unanimously, and it 
passed the Senate by a vote of 97-3.  None of this mattered.  The 
Court in City of Boerne v. Flores struck down the Act and chided Con-
gress to boot.58
Concern for judicial supremacy arguably governed the Supreme 
Court’s refusal to overturn a congressional statute that was designed 
to undo the requirement for Miranda warnings.  Powe argues, “Rehn-
quist, O’Connor, and Kennedy didn’t like Miranda one bit, but they 
liked the thought of Congress gutting a Supreme Court decision far 
less.  Thus Miranda went from 5-4 at the height of the Warren court 
to 7-2 on the Rehnquist Court. If it wasn’t for judicial imperialism, 
such a result simply could not be possible.”
  If in such an instance—where congressional under-
standing of the Constitution was almost unanimous and where the 
Court was not protecting an individual liberty—the Court can rule as 
it did and suffer little public or elite pushback, then protestant consti-
tutionalism seems a bit feeble.   
59  Presidents have been 
more willing than Congress to assert their constitutional interpreting 
responsibilities, but modern Presidents have been no more willing 
than Congress to seriously challenge the Court after it has ruled.60
 
 55. Id. at 314 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 868 
(1992). 
  
 56. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 57. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb et seq. 
 58. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 59. POWE, supra note 54, at 316. 
 60. President Obama did famously tweak the Justices about their decision in Citizens 
United v. Federal Election Commission, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010), but he was roundly criticized by 
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C.  Controlling the Court by Its Legitimacy 
Balkin would argue, I think, that the fact that the Court seems to 
be getting ever more powerful and willing to resist any effort by others 
to engage in serious constitutional interpretation need not mean that 
it will be ever thus.  One thing that might humble and constrain the 
Court and make it willing to entertain the constitutional vision of 
others would be if it were to have to worry about losing its legitimacy.  
Robert McCloskey in his classic The American Supreme Court thought 
that the Court needed to pay particular heed to this concern.  If that 
were ever the case, it seems not to be so now.  Research in political 
science has focused on the legitimacy question at least since 
McCloskey’s book.  With the advent of empirical behavioral research, 
the topic became even more studied.  The lead behavioral researchers 
on this topic are James Gibson and Gregory Caldeira.  Gibson recently 
had the opportunity to present a paper that summarizes the beha-
vioral research on this topic and also reports new findings.  He writes 
that “[p]olitical scientists have been studying the legitimacy of the 
Supreme Court for decades now, and several well established empiri-
cal findings have emerged.”61
The Supreme Court is the most legitimate political institu-
tion within the contemporary United States. . . . [T]he . . . 
American mass public extends great legitimacy to the 
Court . . . .  [S]ome have gone so far as to describe the Su-
preme Court as “bullet-proof,” and therefore able to get 
  Some of the findings are as follows: 
 
many for doing so. Likewise, when he suggested that it would be unprecedented for the 
Supreme Court to overturn the Affordable Care Act, he was criticized not only by Republi-
cans but even by some of his allies. As reported in the Washington Post: 
Many conservatives charged that Obama’s words amounted to a stark warning 
that he intends to campaign against the court if the law or its key elements are 
struck down, while some speculated that he was trying to bully the justices. One 
Texas judge, outraged that Obama seemed to question the court’s very right to 
review laws, ordered the Justice Department to submit a three-page explanation 
of what role the administration believes the courts have.  
  Even some legal scholars sympathetic to Obama and the health-care law are 
saying that the president might have been better off keeping quiet.  “Presidents 
should generally refrain from commenting on pending cases during the process 
of judicial deliberation,” said Harvard Law professor Laurence Tribe, a close 
Obama ally. “Even if such comments won’t affect the justices a bit, they can con-
tribute to an atmosphere of public cynicism that I know this president laments.”   
Peter Wallsten & Robert Barnes, Obama’s Supreme Court Comments Lead Some to Question His 
Strategy, WASH. POST, Apr. 4, 2012, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/ 
obamas-supreme-court-comments-stir-debate/2012/04/04/gIQAtI8EwS_story.html. 
My point is not that presidents or members of Congress never criticize rulings, but 
usually there is little pushback; they tend to accept it and move on—just like citizens. 
 61. Gibson, supra note 52, at 2. 
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away with just about any ruling no matter how unpopu-
lar . . . . 
 The degree of legitimacy of political institutions is ex-
tremely consequential.  For better or for worse, the decisions 
of legitimate institutions tend to “stick”—to draw the ac-
quiescence of citizens, even those citizens who disagree with 
the institution’s policy decisions. . . . . 
. . .  
 Many of the rulings of the Court are unpopular . . . .  The 
puzzle, however, is that dissatisfaction with the policy deci-
sions has not morphed into threats to the legitimacy of the 
institution itself. 
. . . . 
 Democrats and Republicans love the Supreme Court at 
roughly equal levels, as do liberals and conservatives. . . . 
 [S]upport for the Supreme Court has been obdurate.  
Very small peaks and valleys can be found, although they are 
both quite shallow . . . .  Some wonder whether anything the 
Court might do would imperil its basic support among the 
American people.62
The public feelings of institutional legitimacy are not based upon 
a misperception that the Court agrees with them.  Gibson found that 
roughly 15 percent of respondents place the Court in very close ideo-
logical proximity to themselves.  About 28 percent see the Court as 
quite a bit more liberal than themselves, and 21 percent see the Court 
as quite a bit more conservative.
 
63  Public support does not waver for 
the institution even when there are extremely polarizing decisions.  
So for example, after Bush v. Gore,64 popular support for the Court did 
not diminish,65 and some actually claim that it was enhanced.66  Even 
more remarkable, given the Court’s decided turn to the right in the 
period between 1987 and 2001 (which included Bush v. Gore), there 
was no decrease in loyalty toward the Court among Democrats or 
African-Americans.67
 
 62. Id. at 2–3. 
  
 63. Id. at 10. 
 64. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
 65. See, e.g., Herbert M. Kritzer, The Impact of Bush v. Gore on Public Perceptions and Know-
ledge of the Supreme Court, 85 JUDICATURE 32, 35–36 (2001). 
 66. James L. Gibson, The Legitimacy of the U.S. Supreme Court in a Polarized Polity, 4 J. 
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 507, 520 (2007). 
 67. James L. Gibson, Gregory A. Caldeira & Lester Kenyatta Spence, The Supreme Court 
and the U. S. Presidential Election of 2000: Wounds, Self-Inflicted or Otherwise?, 33 BRIT. J. POL. 
SCI. 535, 541–45, 553–54 (2003). 
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For those not familiar with the institutional legitimacy literature, 
it should be pointed out that all of these findings are quite remarka-
ble.  It is not the case that simple disagreement with the policies of an 
institution results in an immediate decline in its perceived legitimacy; 
but when disagreement exists, there does tend to be much more 
movement in perceptions of legitimacy over time, and it is often re-
lated to happiness with the output.  The concept of expertise is a par-
ticularly important component in evaluating legitimacy.  Judges are 
viewed as “experts” in the law.68
Balkin is certainly correct in that good protestant citizens feel 
free to disagree after the Court rules on contentious issues.  He unde-
restimates, however, how much deference there is to the expertise of 
the Justices.  And the longer the “expert” judgment of the Court stays 
in place and is not overturned, the more difficult it becomes not to 
see the Court’s position as what the Constitution means.  This is true 
even when the Court’s position has implications for highly controver-
sial issues of public policy where public dissensus is aroused.  For ex-
ample, to argue today with any hope of success that commercial 
speech should not receive any First Amendment protection would be 
very hard to do.  Or, challenging the concept that corporations are 
“persons” for purposes of having some constitutional protections 
would be very hard to do even if that idea could capture the imagina-
tion of the public.  Think again about the opinions in Casey (uphold-
ing the central holding of Roe) or Dickerson (upholding the Miranda 
rule).  Despite serious disagreement in society and by many of the Jus-
tices, the Court’s original rulings must be upheld, so we are told, for 
the good of the Constitution and stability in law.  There are obvious 
exceptions, thankfully Brown overturned Plessy, but overturning 
precedent is not a frequent occurrence.  Of course, “distinguishing” 
precedent is fairly common, but the first mover creates path depen-
dence, and it is rare to go all the way back to square one.   
  Law is seen as requiring technical 
expertise and mere mortals or citizens are wary of contradicting the 
judgment of experts.  Such deference is not limited to citizens.  One 
can hear the same thing said by members of Congress after the Court 
has told us what the Constitution means.   
We could have a test of Balkin’s premise soon.  Let us assume 
that the Court throws out the Affordable Care Act69
 
 68. Gibson, supra note 
 or at least the in-
dividual mandate part of it.  And let us assume (against all political 
52, at 6.  Every law professor experiences first-year students who 
are willing to assume that something must be correct because a judge said it.   
 69. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 
(2010). 
 1120 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:1098 
science predictions to the contrary) the 2012 elections produced the 
following scenario: a Democratically controlled filibuster-proof Se-
nate, a Democratic House, and a second-term President Obama.  And 
let us also assume that Obama got to replace some of the conservative 
Justices with liberals.  Would Congress repass the individual mandate 
and send it back to the Court?  Maybe, but I think it is doubtful.  
More likely, Congress would accept the Court’s ruling of unconstitu-
tionality and would probably try to find another route.  One might 
suggest that this proves Balkin’s point, but finding another route 
would be exceedingly difficult, which is why Congress came up with 
the individual mandate scheme in the first place.  If the Court over-
turns the mandate, I suspect that we will go a very long time without a 
national health care plan irrespective of electoral outcomes.  And I 
suspect that the use of individual mandates as a tool to make public 
policy under the Commerce Clause would be foreclosed despite the 
makeup of future Congresses and Courts.  Conversely, I predict that if 
we are told by the current Justices that the individual mandate is con-
stitutional, then many will come to believe that they were incorrect 
about the constitutional issue, if not the policy issue.  And the longer 
that opinion stands the harder it would be to dislodge.   
In any event, that is my story at least with respect to a catholic 
Court and an observant public.  I just do not think that Balkin, in his 
story, sufficiently accounts for the faith that Americans have in the 
catholic vision of the U.S. Supreme Court and for the difficulty in 
making the institution democratically responsive.  More importantly, 
there is every indication that this faith continues to grow stronger de-
spite profound disappointments and disagreements.  Even the Vati-
can must be impressed.  
VI.  STRUCTURAL OBSTACLES TO REDEMPTIVE CHANGE 
Sandy Levinson, with whom Balkin is a frequent partner in 
crime, poses a particularly tough challenge to Balkin’s story.  Levin-
son in much of his later work has become known for his focus on the 
structural problems of our political system.  I cannot imagine that an-
yone who knows Levinson or has heard him speak has not heard 
about the following problems: the mal-apportioned, democracy-
thwarting Senate; the time between Election Day and the inaugura-
tion; the inability to have a no-confidence vote to remove the Presi-
dent; the misguided belief that the American constitutional tradition 
believes in the unitary executive (forty-eight states do not have unitary 
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executives), and the list goes on.70  In fact, Levinson believes that the 
system is so broken and so unable to be fixed by normal politics that 
there is a need for a constitutional convention.71
Ironically, Balkin’s book is too Court- and Constitution-focused.  
I say ironically because precisely what he is trying to do is make the 
Constitution and the constitutional order about something much 
larger than what the Supreme Court does or what is only within the 
four corners of the written document.  For Balkin, the Constitution is 
a framework under which political institutions should be free to go-
vern and try to make a more just system.  For most political scientists, 
trying to understand how to make the United States a more just socie-
ty living up to its promises would not begin with a focus on the Consti-
tution.  Politics is about power.  Governing is about power.  It is also 
about institutions and structures, but these have to be understood in 
terms of power.  Political scientists would focus on who has the power, 
how it can be used, who can achieve it, and who cannot.  What can 
thwart power?  A roused public is always a source of power, but struc-
tures and incentives can do much to divert or drain it.  Balkin talks 
about social movements, deliberation, feedback mechanisms, and so 
on, but all of this has to be thought about in terms of the bigger pic-
ture of other political structures, incentives, and power.  Modern 
  Though I certainly 
do not share in his desire for a constitutional convention, and I disag-
ree about whether some things on balance are good or bad, I usually 
find his description and analysis of political structures persuasive.  
The hard-wiring of structures and incentives matter much more than 
most legal scholars seem to acknowledge if the amount of attention 
they give to it is an indication of perceived importance.  More impor-
tantly, structures and incentives make the ability to make profound 
changes very difficult.  Levinson’s focus (as has some of Balkin’s) has 
increasingly been to think about the Constitution outside the courts, 
and to think about the structural and unlitigated parts of the Consti-
tution.  I raise Levinson’s (and Balkin’s) work here to bolster one of 
my critiques of Balkin. 
 
 70. SANFORD LEVINSON, FRAMED: AMERICA’S 51 CONSTITUTIONS AND THE CRISIS OF 
GOVERNANCE (2012); SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE 
THE CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND HOW WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) (2006); 
CONSTITUTIONAL STUPIDITIES, CONSTITUTIONAL TRAGEDIES (William N. Eskridge & San-
ford Levinson eds., 1998); RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995).  
 71. Levinson claims that he has come to many of these positions largely by returning to 
his roots as a political scientist.  Frankly, I do not think he ever really abandoned them; it is 
just that it has come to play a greater role in his teaching.   
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structures and incentives are increasingly not responsive to the type of 
change mechanisms that Balkin proffers.  
This is an unfair critique of Balkin.  It is the typical “you should 
have written the book that I would write.”  Even more unfair, it seems 
to suggest that Balkin needed to analyze the entire political system in 
order to have something to say and before he could declare his faith.  
That is not really my point.  My point is that even if we were to adopt a 
theory of framework originalism, and even if there was much protes-
tant constitutional deliberation and dissensus that called for change, 
and even if liberal Democratic judges were appointed to the Court 
(something I assume would be Balkin’s hope), there would still be 
other institutional barriers such as many of those discussed by Levin-
son and others that would make Balkin’s strategy for constitutional 
redemption very difficult.  
Sure, the Constitution can be amended in theory; reality is 
another thing.  Sure, political and social movements can form among 
the people to bring about change.  But constitutionally hard-wired 
structures have made significant change very difficult no matter how 
intense the feelings are of a majority of citizens—structures such as 
the Senate, the Electoral College, federalism, separation of powers, 
single member districts, and Article V of the Constitution.  These 
hard-wired provisions have, in turn, developed structures and institu-
tions that are pretty calcified if not technically unchangeable: political 
parties, the filibuster, the decline in competitive electoral districts, ex-
traordinary protection for incumbents, polarization, the unstoppable 
rise of presidential power, the extraordinary role of money in politics, 
the extraordinary proliferation of undigested information, segmenta-
tion of how citizens receive information that encourages people to 
have their own biases go unchallenged, the decline in structures that 
encourage civic engagement, and the list goes on.   
In theory, all of these things could be changed, but there are 
huge barriers to accomplishing this that are structural, political, eco-
nomic, psychological, and legal.  Constitutional law has aided and ab-
etted, indeed at times created the barriers to change, which makes it 
even more difficult to change them.  As one example, campaign con-
tributions are protected speech which privileges those with money.  
Another example is the extraordinary rise in presidential power and 
the diminution of other institutions of government.  Political scien-
tists have been talking about this for decades.  Belatedly it has drawn 
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the attention of law professors.72
Change has always been difficult in the American political sys-
tem, but I would argue, bolstered by much research in political 
science, that change has become exceedingly more difficult.  Balkin 
understands the barriers to change as well as anyone, but he evidently 
is not so troubled by them, or he puts a great deal of faith in the abili-
ty to overcome them because of protestant constitutionalism.   I am 
far more troubled by the barriers to change.  It is why after his power-
ful sermon and invitation, I am not quite prepared to walk down the 
aisle and make a personal profession of faith based on Balkin’s theol-
ogy. 
  Relevant here is that many argue 
that the rise in presidential power seriously diminishes the opportuni-
ties for meaningful linkages between the people and the government 
which can effect change.  
VII.  RELIGIOUS METAPHORS 
Another hat, now as a professor.  I worry about students making 
more of analogies and metaphors than they should, or at times not 
quite getting the metaphor.  Anyone who teaches or thinks about the 
First Amendment knows the value and pitfalls of the “marketplace of 
ideas” metaphor.  Balkin acknowledges that his descriptions of reli-
gion are oversimplified and that one can only take a metaphor so far.  
I began this Article by saying that I like Balkin’s (and Levinson’s) reli-
gious metaphors and find them very useful and instructive.  But as 
with any metaphor, they can be misunderstood or not convey precise-
ly what the user wants them to convey.  The protestantism that Balkin 
and Levinson describe is protestantism in theory, but not so much in 
reality, especially these days.  I see two potential problems that may 
pose some confusion in terms of instructiveness.  First, unlike Catho-
licism where there is only one true and apostolic church, describing 
what it means to be Protestant, both in theory and in practice, is far 
more difficult.  Different sects of Protestantism are so different that 
they are almost separate religions.73
 
 72. See, e.g., ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER 
THE MADISONIAN REPUBLIC (2010). 
  Indeed today, many Protestant 
denominations are much closer to Catholicism than they are to other 
Protestant sects.  Second, to the extent that Balkin and Levinson de-
scribe Protestantism, it is largely a description of “mainline protestant-
 73. Balkin and Levinson both acknowledge that there are many differences among 
Protestants.  The classic distinction with Catholicism that they make was historically true 
and is still true enough for their purposes. 
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ism,” and that has become an endangered species.  Most of my stu-
dents would have no clue as to what it means to be Protestant.  What 
they know is what is taught in their particular non-denominational 
church.  
For the most part, the crucial difference between Protestantism 
and Catholicism is not sola scriptura versus the magisterium; rather it 
is the priesthood of the believer.  It is true that scripture has been and 
remains important to Protestants, and it underpins the concept of the 
priesthood of all believers, but the “sola” part of “sola scriptura” is 
problematic.  As one example, systematic theology plays a major role 
in much Protestant theology and that often requires looking to far 
more than scripture.  All interpretations are not acceptable.  Syste-
matic theology, among other things, is an argument against that.  One 
thing that separates many Protestant sects is whether or not they are 
creedal.  Some Protestant churches recite and subscribe to creeds 
such as the Apostles’ Creed.  Others are adamantly non-creedal, the 
most prominent example being Baptists—at least that used to be the 
case.  Subscribing to a creed is much like accepting the magisterium, 
although most historical creeds are more scripturally based.  The 
point here is that, even to mainline Protestants, hearing Protestantism 
described in the terms of the early reformers or solely in terms of sola 
scriptura would not quite match their understanding.   
More problematic for the metaphor in terms of its teaching value 
is the decline of mainline Protestantism and denominationalism, 
which is being replaced largely with non-denominational churches.  
Related to this is that many such churches are fundamentalist or very 
conservative.  Even within denominations, the rise of fundamentalism 
has fundamentally changed the nature of the denomination—the 
most prominent example is undoubtedly the Southern Baptists—or it 
has caused a schism.  Much has been written about all of this. I men-
tion these things only to demonstrate how for some people the meta-
phors may not quite ring true or they may not be understood.  Partic-
ularly within fundamentalist churches, there is little tolerance for 
interpretations of scripture that are not consonant with the belief of 
their fundamentalist leaders.  Even in historically non-creedal 
churches, seminary professors are being required to subscribe to cer-
tain statements of beliefs.  They may not be able to be excommuni-
cated from their church, but they are excommunicated from their 
jobs.  Likewise, in some independent churches, congregants can be 
shunned for beliefs contrary to the teachings of their church.  Such 
practices have always been a part of Protestantism, but they tended to 
reside in minor sects or those denominations at the extreme.  Such 
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churches are now a significant part of Protestantism and are growing.  
A related phenomenon is the increasing authority of individual pas-
tors.  Many wield extraordinary power.  Democratic structures are be-
ing replaced by more authoritarian hierarchies with a powerful pastor 
sitting at the top.  He, and they are almost always “he’s,” now has 
powers and governs in ways that would make the Pope jealous.  The 
Pope can have the final and infallible word on doctrine, but popes 
tend to use this power sparingly.  The new protestant popes, as some 
call them, countenance little disobedience either as it relates to the-
ology or church governance.  By contrast, until the present Pope (and 
some say his predecessor) began to tighten the reins, theological dis-
sensus was far more robust in Catholicism than it was in non-mainline 
Protestantism. 
Balkin and Levinson were not writing books on religion, and for 
all my quibbles, I think the religious analogies worked for their pur-
poses and for readers of my generation.  I am just not sure they will be 
so clear to younger readers.  
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
Oh ye of little faith.  The disciples had reason to be fearful of the 
storm on the Sea of Galilee, but Jesus not only rebuked the storm, he 
rebuked the disciples for their lack of faith with the famous line.  He 
had to do this a lot.  In a way, Balkin does the same to us.  Balkin is 
clear-eyed about the need for constitutional redemption and the fact 
that it is not inevitable.  Yet he is unapologetic in his faith. His call to 
faith is thoughtful, inspiring, and relatively novel these days, at least 
among those who do not have blind faith.  It actually feels kind of 
good to be rebuked in the way he does it.  We are told that faith can 
move mountains.  I see a lot more mountains than does Balkin, and 
we differ some in what it will take to move them.  For all the talk 
about Protestantism and Catholicism, Balkin really sounds Jewish in 
his call for a continual striving to achieve a just society.  The Jewish re-
ligion is not known for proselytizing, but constitutional Judaism has a 
compelling story for attracting converts of many types, and it may be 
the only one true way to redemption.   
 
